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The challenges and opportunities in the Middle-East and North Africa demand new approaches in the U.S. Military's SFA efforts there. This assessment is near universal, but most research and analysis has been focused on advising and assisting partners in their countries, and how to optimize our unit structures and professional competencies to do so. The common belief is conducting SFA "forward" is the best approach, however we have numerous opportunities to conduct SFA more effectively and efficiently here in CONUS. This paper offers ideas on how to conduct SFA activities here in CONUS that are relatively low-cost and low-risk, yet yield a high return in terms of strategic relationship building and influence with our critical partners in the MiddleEast. These initiatives and programs will maximize the strategic opportunities presented by the recent transitions of governments and militaries in the region following the "Arab Spring" by influencing the emerging strategic leaders of those countries ultimately building, solidifying, and in some cases repairing, the critical military-to-military relationships that will buttress the strategic relationships we have with countries throughout the Middle-East and North Africa.
"Made in the U.S.A." CONUS-based Security Force Assistance Approaches in the Middle East and North Africa
The challenges and opportunities in the Middle-East and North Africa demand new approaches in the United States military's security force assistance (SFA) efforts
there. This assessment is near universal, but most analysis has been focused on advising and assisting partners in their countries, and how to optimize unit structures and professional competencies to do so. The common belief is conducting SFA "forward," focusing on tactical proficiencies and development of allies and partners' capacity across the warfighting functions, is the best approach. In fact, however, the U.S. can accomplish many of its SFA objectives in a low-cost, low-signature manner in the United States by expanding professional military education (PME) opportunities for ascending military leaders from partner countries, expanding exchange officer programs, and integrating partner nation military units in the exercises and training events conducted in the United States.
The U.S. has an opportunity to secure the strategic gains made over the last 10 years in Iraq, and maximize the strategic opportunities presented by the recent transitions of governments and militaries in the region following the "Arab Spring."
There is clearly a strategic objective for stability in the region, and the U.S. can contribute to the accomplishment of that objective in a long-term manner by influencing partner military leaders through PME, embedding partner nation leaders in tactical and operational units and headquarters, and integrating partner nation units in training exercises conducted in the United States. This influence will help partner nation militaries defeat internal threats, defend against external threats, and serve as reliable and capable allies who help address issues of mutual concern.
2 In a time of diminishing resources and enduring commitments the U.S. cannot let opportunities slip away. As the U.S. Army Capstone Concept articulates, in spite of the rebalance to the Pacific, the greater Middle East is the area where land forces would most likely be employed for the foreseeable future. 1 With limited resources and little tolerance for large scale U.S. troop presence in the region, there are still opportunities to improve military-to-military relationships and collective capabilities and capacity to address issues of mutual concern through CONUS-based security force assistance endeavors.
One of the main underpinnings of the United States' strategic relationships with its Middle East partners will be military-to-military contacts, relationships, exercises, and security force assistance actions. The reality is, however, there will be little tolerance for large contingents of US Forces in the region for some time. The other reality is that for the foreseeable future, the Department of Defense faces a fiscally constrained environment, where multi-million dollar exercises overseas will be few and far between.
In light of the strategic shift to the PACOM AOR, available resources for the Middle East will become leaner. How then can the U.S. shape the environment and prevent future conflict as well as secure the gains made over the last decade and take advantage of recent transitions following the Arab Spring? How can the U.S. continue to assist the security forces of those nations and continue to solidify relationships with those countries and their militaries?
PME (IMET & NEISC)
Expanding PME opportunities for the United States' Middle East and North African partners will ultimately build, solidify, and in some cases repair, the critical 3 military-to-military relationships that serve to buttress the strategic relationships the U.S.
has with countries throughout the Middle-East and North Africa.
As military training doctrine illustrates, and common sense dictates, when resources are limited, the focus and resources should be applied to leader training & education. Increasing PME opportunities for partner nation military leaders is relatively low-cost and low-risk, yet yields a high return in terms of strategic relationship building and influence with critical allies and partners. There is a proven system where the U.S. addition to military competencies they will develop through the respective curriculum.
As one of the major limiting factors with the current IMET PME opportunities is English language proficiency, at NEISC the instruction and course materials would be in Arabic, allowing the U.S. to train and educate substantially more emerging leaders from the Middle East and North Africa --far more than can be afforded the opportunity through IMET.
The NEISC faculty would be multinational and include interagency partners.
Ideally the deputy commandant would be from a partner nation, and interagency faculty members would include State Department Foreign Service officers with experience in the region and Arabic language proficiency. Each seminar would include students from partner nations across the region as well as U.S. military sister services and the interagency.
Educating and developing partner nation military leaders builds the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence in their militaries and between U.S. and partner countries. These efforts provide significant payoff in shaping the environments and preventing future conflict or crisis. Relationships are important, and relationships established through shared PME experiences generate trust between professionals. That trust is critical in terms of assuring allies and contributing to security and cooperation in the region.
Attending PME in the United States through IMET or at an institute like NEISC, Everything has a cost, and there is little doubt that the return on the relatively small fiscal investment yields benefits that will serve U.S. strategic security objectives well. Some will undoubtedly cite cost as a limiting factor on expanding partner-nation 8 PME opportunities, but the return on the strategic investment is substantial. The annual operating cost for WHINSEC is approximately $12 million USD. 7 WHINSEC offers a broad curriculum that includes several courses specific to the SOUTHCOM Commanders priorities, specifically counternarcotic and several law enforcement courses. NEISC would be smaller scale, and a conservative estimate of annual operating expenses is less than $10 million USD. Examine what the U.S. has invested in the region over the years and it is clear that the return on this relatively small investment will be significant. The Middle East is, and will continue to be, a strategically vital region, and as such will require continued attention and assistance.
In FY 2011, the United States spent more on IMET funded PME opportunities for Poland, Georgia, and the Czech Republic than it did for Iraq. 8 The U.S. should not reduce IMET funding for these critical partner nations, but more resources should definitely be applied to developing and influencing the future senior leaders of Middle East partner nations. In FY 11 the United States hosted 1801 European students in U.S. military PME venues, but only 994 (approximately half as many) from Middle East and Near East partners. 9 Most of European and NATO militaries have PME institutions, while many Middle East partners do not; creating NEISC will help bridge this gap.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in CJCS Guide 1800, underscored the importance of mil-to-mil activities. This guide states, "PME provides a substantial opportunity to develop and foster long lasting relationships with international actors."
The Chairman communicates that PME better prepares U.S. and international officers for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments. The guidance also tasks Geographic Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) to incorporate PME into 9 their Theater Campaign Plans as part of the effort to shape the region and deter conflict. 10 The Chairman clearly sees the value and potential influence from this investment.
The U.S. should expand proven PME programs through the development of NEISC and increasing IMET opportunities. The current effort through IMET is sound, but anemic. The development of an institution focused on providing PME to the United can match resources with stated priorities.
INTEGRATION OF PARTNER NATION MILITARIES IN CONUS EXERCISES
There is great value in conducting combined and multinational exercises. They foster cooperation, strengthen relationships, reinforce partnerships and add realism as virtually all foreseeable military operations will have a multinational component to them. program, but on a much smaller scale. Like the PME exchanges described earlier, relationships would be built with future strategic leaders, and long-term benefits would emerge that would reinforce understanding, cooperation, and focus on mutual security and military objectives.
SUMMARY
The United States' interests in the Middle East and North Africa are strategically critical, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. In light of the strategic rebalance to the PACOM AOR, coupled with security concerns and political sensitivities and turmoil in many of the countries in the CENTCOM AOR, the U.S. will have to assist its partners in a very low signature manner and do so with resources that are sharply reduced in comparison to what was available over the last 12 years. By focusing on developing their most promising leaders through PME conducted in the U.S., expanding exchange officer programs, and integrating partner nation military units in U.S. based exercises, the low signature and low operational risk requirements of U.S. security force assistance efforts are met, and long term influence with partner militaries throughout the Middle East and North Africa is attained.
In the past, critics assumed that manpower intensive security force assistance actions and counterinsurgency efforts jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war. 12 In light of the current strategic conditions in the Middle East and North Africa, shaping the environment and preventing conflict is as important, if not moreso, than preparing for conflict itself. The initiatives described will do just that -prevent conflict by improving mil-to-mil relationships with partners in the years from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The military has learned that partnership is better than clientism and is adapting its command structure once optimized for waging major combat to one that is focused on conflict prevention. There is still a tremendous warfighting capability in the U.S. military, but coalition warfare is the norm and developing compatible warfighting partners is a key goal of this cooperative strategy."
14
Expanding PME exchanges, conducting more multinational exercises in the U.S, and expanding individual exchange officer programs will bolster the Joint Engagement
Concept articulated in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operation Activity Concepts, which aims "to improve the capabilities of or cooperation with allies and other partners." 15 3 rd Army and U.S. Army Central Command has identified shaping the environment in the Middle East as one of its imperatives, and the Commanding General has articulated that exporting trust and professionalism to U.S. partners in the region, through programs like those described in this paper, will instill actions that promote cooperation and effectively address mutual security concerns.
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The January 2012 Strategic guidance tells the Department of Defense to develop innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approached to achieve U.S. security objectives.
Establishing NEISC, expanding exchange officer program and integrating partner nation units in CONUS training exercises, and all of the cascading long-term relationships that will emerge, will help shape the strategic environment in the Middle East, will help
